53,541 research outputs found
Recommended from our members
Late antiquity and the antiquarian
Arnaldo Momigliano, the most influential modern student of antiquarianism, advanced the view that there was a late antique antiquarianism, but also lamented the absence of study of the history of antiquarianism in this period. Part of the challenge, however, has been to define the object of such a study. Rather than "finding" antiquarianism in late antiquity as Momigliano did, this article argues that a history that offers explicit analogies between late antique evidence and the avowed antiquarianism of early modern Europe allows a more self-conscious and critical history of late antique engagement with the past. The article offers three examples of this form of analysis, comparing practices of statue collecting in Renaissance Rome and the late RomanWest, learned treatises on the Roman army by Vegetius and Justus Lipsius, and feelings of attachment to a local past as a modern antiquarian stereotype and in a pair of letters to and from Augustine of Hippo
Bread as Food and Medicament in Oribasiusβ Writings
Treatises left by Oribasius (first and foremost his Collectiones medicae and Eclogae medicamentorum) preserve a vast body of information on the varieties of bread eaten in late antiquity, characterise them from the point of view of dietetics, list medical conditions in which a given variety is especially beneficial, and name medical preparations which include the product. The present study elaborates on Oribasiusβ dietetic knowledge and his input into the development of dietetic discourse (namely his influence on Byzantine dietetic doctrine), determines Oribasiusβ main information sources on bread, characterises bread as food, lists varieties which were thought to be used by physicians and explains reasons for the preferences, and finally exemplifies cures and medical preparations which include bread
Society, Politics, and Ideology of Classical Athens
Π ΠΊΠ½ΠΈΠ³Π΅ β Π½Π° ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΠΈ Π°Π½Π°Π»ΠΈΠ·Π° ΡΠ°Π·Π½ΠΎΠΎΠ±ΡΠ°Π·Π½ΡΡ
ΠΈΡΡΠΎΡΠ½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² ΠΈ ΠΈΡΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΏΠΎΡΠ»Π΅Π΄Π½ΠΈΡ
Π΄ΠΎΡΡΠΈΠΆΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠΉ ΠΈΡΡΠΎΡΠΈΠΎΠ³ΡΠ°ΡΠΈΠΈ β ΡΠ°ΡΡΠΌΠ°ΡΡΠΈΠ²Π°ΡΡΡΡ Π΄ΠΈΡΠΊΡΡΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π½ΡΠ΅ ΠΏΡΠΎΠ±Π»Π΅ΠΌΡ ΠΈΡΡΠΎΡΠΈΠΈ ΠΡΠΈΠ½ VβIV Π²Π². Π΄ΠΎ Π½.Ρ., Π° ΡΠ°ΠΊΠΆΠ΅ ΡΠΎΠΏΡΡΡΡΠ²ΡΡΡΠΈΠ΅ ΡΠ΅ΠΌΡ. ΠΠ·Π°ΠΈΠΌΠΎΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΠΏΠΎΠ»ΠΈΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΡ
Π»ΠΈΠ΄Π΅ΡΠΎΠ² ΠΈ ΡΠΎΠ»ΠΏ (Π½Π΅ΠΎΡΠ³Π°Π½ΠΈΠ·ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Π½ΡΡ
ΠΌΠ°ΡΡΠΎΠ²ΡΡ
ΡΠ±ΠΎΡΠΈΡ) ΡΠ°ΡΡΠΌΠ°ΡΡΠΈΠ²Π°Π΅ΡΡΡ Π² ΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ²ΡΡ
Π΄Π²ΡΡ
ΡΠ°Π·Π΄Π΅Π»Π°Ρ
. Π‘ΠΎΠ²Π΅ΡΡΠ΅Π½Π½ΠΎ ΡΠ°Π·Π½ΡΡ
(Π΄Π°ΠΆΠ΅ ΠΏΡΠΎΡΠΈΠ²ΠΎΠΏΠΎΠ»ΠΎΠΆΠ½ΡΡ
ΠΏΠΎ ΠΏΠΎΠ»ΠΈΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΠΌ Π²Π·Π³Π»ΡΠ΄Π°ΠΌ) Π»ΠΈΠ΄Π΅ΡΠΎΠ² ΠΊΠ»Π°ΡΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΡ
ΠΡΠΈΠ½ ΠΎΠ±ΡΠ΅Π΄ΠΈΠ½ΡΠ»Π° ΠΎΠ±ΡΠ°Ρ Π²ΠΏΠΈΡΠ°Π½Π½ΠΎΡΡΡ Π² Β«ΠΏΠΎΠ»ΠΈΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΠ΅ ΡΠ°ΠΌΠΊΠΈΒ», Π½Π΅Π²ΠΎΠ·ΠΌΠΎΠΆΠ½ΠΎΡΡΡ ΠΈΡΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΎΠ²Π°ΡΡ Β«ΡΠ½Π΅ΡΠ³ΠΈΡ ΠΌΠ°ΡΡΒ» Π² ΡΠ²ΠΎΠΈΡ
ΡΠ΅Π»ΡΡ
.
ΠΠ° ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Π΅ Π°Π½Π°Π»ΠΈΠ·Π° ΡΠ»ΠΎΠ², ΠΎΠ±ΠΎΠ·Π½Π°ΡΠ°ΡΡΠΈΡ
ΡΠΎΠ»ΠΏΡ, ΠΈ ΡΠΎΠΎΠ±ΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠΉ ΠΈΡΡΠΎΡΠ½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² ΠΎ Π²ΠΎΠ·ΠΌΠΎΠΆΠ½ΡΡ
Π΄Π΅ΠΉΡΡΠ²ΠΈΡΡ
Π½Π΅ΠΎΡΠ³Π°Π½ΠΈΠ·ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Π½ΡΡ
ΠΌΠ°ΡΡΠΎΠ²ΡΡ
ΡΠ±ΠΎΡΠΈΡ Π°Π²ΡΠΎΡ Π΄Π΅Π»Π°Π΅Ρ Π²ΡΠ²ΠΎΠ΄ ΠΎ ΡΠΎΠΌ, ΡΡΠΎ ΡΠΎΠ»ΠΏΠ° Π² ΠΊΠ»Π°ΡΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΡ
ΠΡΠΈΠ½Π°Ρ
Π½Π΅ ΠΈΠ³ΡΠ°Π»Π° ΠΏΠΎΡΡΠΈ Π½ΠΈΠΊΠ°ΠΊΠΎΠΉ ΡΠΎΠ»ΠΈ Π² ΠΏΠΎΠ»ΠΈΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΎΠΉ ΠΆΠΈΠ·Π½ΠΈ, ΠΎΠ΄Π½Π°ΠΊΠΎ ΠΈΡΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΎΠ²Π°Π»Π°ΡΡ ΠΊΠ°ΠΊ ΡΡΠ΅Π΄ΡΡΠ²ΠΎ ΠΈΠ΄Π΅ΠΎΠ»ΠΎΠ³ΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΡΡΡΠ°ΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ. ΠΠ»Ρ Ρ
Π°ΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠ΅ΡΠΈΡΡΠΈΠΊΠΈ ΠΈΠ΄Π΅ΠΎΠ»ΠΎΠ³ΠΈΠΈ Π΄Π΅ΠΌΠΎΠΊΡΠ°ΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΡ
ΠΡΠΈΠ½ ΠΈΡΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΠ·ΡΠ΅ΡΡΡ Π½Π΅ΠΎΠΆΠΈΠ΄Π°Π½Π½ΡΠΉ ΠΈΡΡΠΎΡΠ½ΠΈΠΊ: ΡΠΎΠ±ΡΡΠ²Π΅Π½Π½ΡΠ΅ ΠΈΠΌΠ΅Π½Π°, ΠΊΠΎΡΠΎΡΡΠ΅ Π°Π½Π°Π»ΠΈΠ·ΠΈΡΡΡΡΡΡ Ρ ΠΈΡΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΠ΅ΠΌ ΠΊΠ°ΠΊ ΠΏΡΠΎΡΠΎΠΏΠΎΠ³ΡΠ°ΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΡ
ΠΌΠ΅ΡΠΎΠ΄ΠΎΠ², ΡΠ°ΠΊ ΠΈ ΠΌΠ΅ΡΠΎΠ΄ΠΎΠ² ΠΎΠΏΠΈΡΠ°ΡΠ΅Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΡΡΠ°ΡΠΈΡΡΠΈΠΊΠΈ. ΠΡΠΎΠ±ΡΠΉ ΠΈΠ½ΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅Ρ ΠΏΡΠ΅Π΄ΡΡΠ°Π²Π»ΡΠ΅Ρ Π°Π½Π°Π»ΠΈΠ· Β«Π·Π°ΠΊΡΡΡΡΡ
Β» ΠΎΠ½ΠΎΠΌΠ°ΡΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΡ
ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΏΠ»Π΅ΠΊΡΠΎΠ², ΠΊΠΎΡΠΎΡΡΠΉ ΠΏΠΎΠ·Π²ΠΎΠ»ΡΠ΅Ρ ΠΏΡΠΎΠ²Π΅ΡΡΠΈ ΠΊΠΎΡΡΠ΅Π»ΡΡΠΈΡ ΠΌΠ΅ΠΆΠ΄Ρ Β«Π΄Π΅ΠΌΠΎΠΊΡΠ°ΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΠΌΠΈΒ» ΠΈΠΌΠ΅Π½Π°ΠΌΠΈ ΠΈ ΡΠΎΡΠΈΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΠΌ ΡΡΠ°ΡΡΡΠΎΠΌ Π°ΡΠΈΠ½ΡΠΊΠΈΡ
Π³ΡΠ°ΠΆΠ΄Π°Π½.
Π ΠΈΡΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΠΈ ΠΈΡΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Ρ ΠΎΡΠΈΠ³ΠΈΠ½Π°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΠ΅ ΠΏΠΎΠ΄Ρ
ΠΎΠ΄Ρ, ΠΊΠΎΡΠΎΡΡΠ΅ ΠΏΠΎΠ·Π²ΠΎΠ»ΡΡΡ ΠΏΠΎ-Π½ΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠΌΡ Π²Π·Π³Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡΡ ΠΊΠ°ΠΊ Π½Π° Π°ΡΠΈΠ½ΡΠΊΠΎΠ΅ ΠΎΠ±ΡΠ΅ΡΡΠ²ΠΎ VβIV Π²Π². Π΄ΠΎ Π½.Ρ., ΡΠ°ΠΊ ΠΈ Π½Π° Π΄ΡΡΠ³ΠΈΠ΅ ΠΏΡΠΎΠ±Π»Π΅ΠΌΡ ΠΈΡΡΠΎΡΠΈΠΈ Π°Π½ΡΠΈΡΠ½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΌΠΈΡΠ°.
In the book debatable problems of Athenian history in 5th-4th centuries B.C. and concomitant issues are examined on the basis of various sources analysis and usage of recent advances in historiography. Interrelations between political leaders and crowds (unorganized mass gatherings) are considered in the two first parts. In terms of analysis of words designating crowds and sources information on probable actions of unorganized mass gatherings, the author concludes that the crowd in classical Athens almost did not influence politics but was used as a tool of ideological frightening. For description of democratic Athens ideology, proper names are analyzed with use of both prosopographical and descriptive statistics methods.
In the paper original approaches are utilized; they make it possible to look in a new way at both Athenian society in 5th-4th centuries B.C. and other issues in ancient world history
Greek and Roman Logic
In ancient philosophy, there is no discipline called βlogicβ in the contemporary sense of βthe study of formally valid arguments.β Rather, once a subfield of philosophy comes to be called βlogic,β namely in Hellenistic philosophy, the field includes (among other things) epistemology, normative epistemology, philosophy of language, the theory of truth, and what we call logic today. This entry aims to examine ancient theorizing that makes contact with the contemporary conception. Thus, we will here emphasize the theories of the βsyllogismβ in the Aristotelian and Stoic traditions. However, because the context in which these theories were developed and discussed were deeply epistemological in nature, we will also include references to the areas of epistemological theorizing that bear directly on theories of the syllogism, particularly concerning βdemonstration.β Similarly, we will include literature that discusses the principles governing logic and the components that make up arguments, which are topics that might now fall under the headings of philosophy of logic or non-classical logic. This includes discussions of problems and paradoxes that connect to contemporary logic and which historically spurred developments of logical method. For example, there is great interest among ancient philosophers in the question of whether all statements have truth-values. Relevant themes here include future contingents, paradoxes of vagueness, and semantic paradoxes like the liar. We also include discussion of the paradoxes of the infinite for similar reasons, since solutions have introduced sophisticated tools of logical analysis and there are a range of related, modern philosophical concerns about the application of some logical principles in infinite domains. Our criterion excludes, however, many of the themes that Hellenistic philosophers consider part of logic, in particular, it excludes epistemology and metaphysical questions about truth. Ancient philosophers do not write treatises βOn Logic,β where the topic would be what today counts as logic. Instead, arguments and theories that count as βlogicβ by our criterion are found in a wide range of texts. For the most part, our entry follows chronology, tracing ancient logic from its beginnings to Late Antiquity. However, some themes are discussed in several eras of ancient logic; ancient logicians engage closely with each otherβs views. Accordingly, relevant publications address several authors and periods in conjunction. These contributions are listed in three thematic sections at the end of our entry
Greek love, orientalism and race : intersections in Classical reception
Classics has been characterised as both a radical and a conservative discipline. Classical reception studies has enjoyed exploring this paradox: antiquity has provided an erotic example for modern homosexual counter-culture as well as a model for running exploitative empires. This article brings these aspects of reception studies together, to examine how the Victorian homosexual reception of the ancient Greeks was framed and worked out in a particular imperial context at the end of the nineteenth century
Introduction
This introduction presents an overview of the key concepts discussed in the subsequent chapters of this book. The book explores, inter alia, the strategy employed by Augustine in using Plato as a pseudo-prophet against later Platonists and explores Eusebiusβ reception of Porphyryβs daemonology. It examines Plotinusβ claim that matter is absolute badness and focuses on Maximus the Confessorβs doctrine of creation and asks whether one may detect any influence on Maximus from Philoponus. The book addresses Christian receptions of Platonic metaphysics and also examines the philosophy of number in Augustineβs early works. It argues that the aspect of Augustineβs philosophy must be read in context with the intellectual problems that occupied him at the beginning of his career as a writer. It draws on a number of sources to investigate the development of the doctrine and the various intellectual issues it confronted, including Platoβs Timaeus, Philo of Alexandria, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Plotinus and, finally, Athanasius
- β¦